Etica convicciones, responsabilidad y verdad.

Max Weber

En La Responsabilidad publicado en Artepolítica hay un fragmento de Política Como Vocación (tambien lo titulan Ciencia y Política) de Max Weber. El fragmento antes mencionado en su contexto es el siguiente:

"Usted puede demostrar a un militante convencido que cree en una ética basada en convicciones o fines últimos, que su acción causará un aumento de las oportunidades de la reacción, un aumento de la opresión y la obstrucción del ascenso de su clase- y usted no causará la impresión más leve sobre él. Cuando las consecuencias de una acción realizada conforme a una ética de la convicción son malas, quien la ejecutó no se siente responsable de aquellas, sino que responsabiliza al mundo, a la estupidez de los hombres o a la voluntad de Dios que los hizo así. Sin embargo un hombre que cree en una ética de la responsabilidad toma en cuenta exactamente las deficiencias promedio de la gente; como Fichte correctamente dijo,  no tiene siquiera el derecho de presuponer la bondad y la  perfección. Él no se siente en una posición para cargar a otros con los resultados de sus propias acciones en la medida de que él era capaz de prever esos resultados; él dirá: estos resultados son el resultado de mi acción. En cambio el creyente en una ética de fines últimos solo se siente 'responsable' de procurar que la llama de las intenciones puras no sea extinguida: por ejemplo, la llama de protesta contra la injusticia de la orden social. Reavivar la llama una y otra vez es el objetivo de sus acciones completamente irracionales, juzgadas en vista de su éxito posible. Son acciones que pueden y solo tendrán un valor meramente ejemplar."

Max Weber distinguió dos éticas basadas en principios irreconciliables y a la vez inseparables. Una es la ética basada en convicciones o, usando las palabras de Weber, una etica de los fines últimos y la otra una ética de la responsabilidad. Expandir texto completo sobre el tema

Extracto parcial de Politics as a Vocation. Una nota del profesor que subió el texto de Weber a sus alumnos:
NOTA DE BRUCE MORK

ESTUDIANTES; ESTO ES UNA VERSIÓN INMENSAMENTE CORREGIDA; 3/4 DE ELLA ESTA FALTANDO, LA MAYOR PARTE DE ESO ESTA RELACIONADO A LAS CONDICIONES ESPECÍFICAS DE ALEMANIA EN 1920. HABIENDO PERDIDO LA PRIMERA GUERRA MUNDIAL, EL KAISER FUE DERROCADO POR UNA REVOLUCIÓN Y LOS SOCIALDEMÓCRATAS SUBIERON AL PODER. WEBER SE DIRIGE A LA GENTE JOVEN CUYO IDEALISMO HA SIDO ESTIMULADO POR ESOS ACONTECIMIENTOS, QUIÉNES VEN LA OPORTUNIDAD DE UNA SOCIEDAD MÁS DEMOCRÁTICA Y MÁS IGUAL.
WEBER NO ESTÁ CONTRA LA DEMOCRACIA, PERO ÉL ES FUERTEMENTE ESCÉPTICO ACERCA DE QUE EL SOCIALISMO (PROPIEDAD ESTATAL Y CONTROL DE LA ECONOMÍA) TRAIGA UNA SITUACIÓN MEJOR PARA LOS CIUDADANOS COMUNES. SU MIEDO CONSISTE EN QUE DE ORIGEN A UNA BUROCRACIA QUE CONTROLE LAS VIDAS DE CADA UNO. PARECE QUE SU OTRO MIEDO ES QUE LOS LÍDERES POLÍTICOS SEAN GENTE DE LA GRAN PASIÓN (O SINVERGÜENZAS QUE FINGEN PASIÓN), PERO CON POCO O NINGÚN ENTENDIMIENTO DE LAS DIFICULTADES DE UNA VOCACIÓN POLÍTICA.

LA POLÍTICA IMPLICA EL CONTROL DEL ESTADO, QUE EN ÚLTIMA INSTANCIA RECURRE A LA POLICÍA Y EL EJÉRCITO (LOS MEDIOS DE VIOLENCIA) PARA APOYAR SUS POLÍTICAS. LOS LÍDERES POLÍTICOS A VECES AFRONTAN SITUACIONES EN LAS CUALES LA ÚNICA OPCIÓN ESTÁ ENTRE LO MALO Y LO TODAVÍA PEOR, SITUACIONES EN LA QUE GENTE INOCENTE SUFRIRÁ Y MORIRÁ, Y CUALQUIER LÍDER POLÍTICO QUE NO TIENE UN ENTENDIMIENTO PROFUNDO DE LA TRAGEDIA INHERENTE DE LA VOCACIÓN POLÍTICA SERÍA MEJOR QUE SIGA UNA CARRERA MÁS HUMILDE QUE NO IMPLICA EL USO DE LOS MEDIOS DE LA VIOLENCIA.

COMO (NORTE)AMERICANOS HEMOS TENIDO MENOS OPORTUNIDAD DE ENTENDER REALMENTE ESTE ASPECTO TRÁGICO DE LA POLÍTICA (EXCEPTO QUIZÁS DURANTE EL PERÍODO DE NUESTRA PROPIA GUERRA CIVIL Y QUIZÁS OTRA VEZ DURANTE LA GUERRA DE VIETNAM). HEMOS SIDO CAPACES DE EVITAR MIRAR A LOS GRUPOS QUE HAN SUFRIDO LAS CONSECUENCIAS DE LA ESTRUCTURA DE PODER EN NUESTRA PROPIA SOCIEDAD Y VERNOS ÚNICAMENTE COMO LA TIERRA DE LA LIBERTAD, LA IGUALDAD, Y LA HERMANDAD. PERO USTED SÓLO TIENE QUE MIRAR LAS DOS GUERRAS QUE MENCIONÉ, O LAS MANIFESTACIONES MÁS PERNICIOSAS DE NUESTRA POLÍTICA EXTERIOR, PARA VER COMO LAS DECISIONES POLÍTICAS EN FUNCION DE NUESTROS INTERESES SE HAN RAMIFICADO EN TÉRMINOS DE VIDAS PERDIDAS O DESTROZADAS.

... the absolute ethic just does not ask for 'consequences.' That is the decisive point.	... la ética absoluta no mide la 'consecuencias' en lo mas mínimo. Este es un punto decisivo.
We must be clear about the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an 'ethic of ultimate ends' or to an 'ethic of responsibility.' This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism. Naturally nobody says that.	Debemos tener en claro el hecho de que toda la conducta éticamente orientada puede ser dirigida por uno de dos principios fundamentales e irreconciliables: la conducta puede estar orientada por 'una ética de fines últimos' o por 'una ética de la responsabilidad.' Esto no quiere decir que una ética de fines últimos es idéntica a la irresponsabilidad, o que una ética de la responsabilidad es idéntica al oportunismo sin principios. Naturalmente nadie dice esto.
However, there is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends - that is, in religious terms, 'The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord' - and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action.	Sin embargo, hay un contraste abismal entre la conducta que sigue la máxima de una ética de fines últimos - en términos religiosos esto se diría 'el cristiano obra correctamente y deja los resultados con el Señor' - y una conducta que sigue la máxima de una ética de la responsabilidad, en cuyo caso uno tiene que dar las razones de los resultados previsibles de la propia acción.
You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of ultimate ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its ascent - and you will not make the slightest impression upon  him. If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor's eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil. However a man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiences of people; as Fichte has correctly said, he does not even have the right to presuppose their goodness and perfection. He does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my action. The believer in an ethic of ultimate ends feels 'responsible' only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not quenched:  for example, the flame of protesting against the injustice of the social order. To rekindle the flame ever anew is the purpose of his quite irrational deeds, judged in view of their possible success. They are acts that can and shall have only exemplary value.	Usted puede demostrar a un militante convencido, que cree en una ética de fines últimos, que su acción causará un aumento de las oportunidades de la reacción, en un aumento de la opresión de su clase y la obstrucción de su ascenso - y usted no causará la impresión más leve sobre él. Si una acción bien intencionada lleva a malos resultados, entonces, desde el punto de vista de este tipo de actor, no fue él sino  el mundo, o la estupidez de otros hombres, o la voluntad de Dios que los hizo así, son los responsables del mal. Sin embargo un hombre que cree en una ética de la responsabilidad toma en cuenta exactamente las deficiencias promedio de la gente; como Fichte correctamente dijo, no tiene siquiera el derecho de presuponer su bondad y perfección. Él no se siente en una posición para cargar a otros con los resultados de sus propias acciones en la medida de que él era capaz de prever esos resultados; él dirá: estos resultados son el resultado de mi acción. En cambio el creyente en una ética de fines últimos solo se siente 'responsable' de procurar que la llama de las intenciones puras no sea extinguida: por ejemplo, la llama de protesta contra la injusticia de la orden social. Reavivar la llama una y otra vez nuevo es el objetivo de sus acciones completamente irracionales, juzgadas en vista de su éxito posible. Son acciones que pueden y solo tendrán un valor meramente ejemplar.
But even herewith the problem is not yet exhausted. No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the attainment of 'good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones - and facing the possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications. From no ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose 'justifies' the ethically dangerous means and ramifications.	Pero el problema todavía no esta agotado. Ninguna ética en el mundo puede evitar el hecho de que en numerosos casos el logro de fines 'buenos' esta atado al hecho que uno debe estar dispuesto a pagar el precio de usar medios moralmente dudosos o al menos peligrosos - y enfrentar la posibilidad o hasta la probabilidad de malas ramificaciones. No existe ética en el mundo que permita saber cuando y hasta que grado un objetivo éticamente bueno  'justifica' medios éticamente peligrosos y sus ramificaciones.
The decisive means for politics is violence. You may see the extent of the tension between means and ends, when viewed ethically, from the following: as is generally known, even during the war the revolutionary socialists (Zimmerwald faction) professed a principle that one might strikingly formulate: 'If we face the choice either of some more years of war and then revolution, or peace now and no revolution, we choose -some more years of war!' Upon the further question: 'What can this revolution bring about?' every scientifically trained socialist would have had the answer: One cannot speak of a transition to an economy that in our sense could be called socialist; a bourgeois economy will re-emerge, merely stripped of the feudal elements and the dynastic vestiges. For this very modest result, they are willing to face 'some more years of war.' One may well say that even with a very robust socialist conviction one might reject a purpose that demands such means. With Bolshevism and Spartacism, and, in general, with any kind of revolutionary socialism, it is pre cisely the same thing. It is of course utterly ridiculous if the power politicians of the old regime are morally denounced for their use of the same means, however justified the rejection of their aims may be.	El medio decisivo para la política es la violencia. Usted puede ver el grado de la tensión ética entre medios y fines con el siguiente ejemplo: como es generalmente conocido, durante la guerra los socialistas revolucionarios (facción de Zimmerwald) profesaron un principio que uno podría formular de manera algo sorprendentemente de este modo: 'si tenemos que optar entre algunos años más de guerra y luego revolución, o de paz ahora y ninguna revolución, elegimos - ¡algunos años más de la guerra!' A la pregunta adicional: '¿qué puede esta revolución traer?' cada socialista científicamente entrenado habría tenido por respuesta: 'Uno no puede hablar de una transición a una economía que en nuestro sentido podría ser llamada el socialista; una economía burguesa surgirá de nuevo, simplemente despojada de los elementos feudales y los vestigios dinásticos'. Para este resultado tan modesto, ellos estan dispuestos a 'algunos años más de la guerra'. Uno bien puede decir  que hasta con una convicción socialista muy fuerte uno podría rechazar un objetivo que demanda  tales medios. Con el Bolcheviquismo y el Espartaquismo, y, en general, con cualquier clase del socialismo revolucionario, es la misma cosa. Es por supuesto completamente ridículo si los políticos de poder del viejo régimen son moralmente condenados de su uso de los mismos medios, no importa que tan justificado este el rechazo de sus objetivos.
The ethic of ultimate ends apparently must go to pieces on the problem of the justification of means by ends. As a matter of fact, logically it has only the possibility of rejecting all action that employs morally dangerous means - in theory! In the world of realities, as a rule, we encounter the ever-renewed experience that the adherent of an ethic of ultimate ends suddenly turns into a chiliastic prophet. Those, for example, who have just preached 'love against violence' now call for the use of force for the last violent deed, which would then lead to a state of affairs in which all violence is annihilated. In the same manner, our officers told the soldiers before every offensive: 'This will be the last one; this one will bring victory and therewith peace.' The proponent of an ethic of absolute ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a cosmic-ethical 'rationalist.' Those of you who know Dostoievski will remember the scene of the 'Grand Inquisitor,' where the problem is poignantly unfolded. If one makes any concessions at all to the principle that the end justifies the means, it is not possible to bring an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility under one roof or to decree ethically which end should justify which means.	La ética de fines últimos aparentemente se conecta con en el problema de la justificación de los medios por los fines. ¡De hecho, lógicamente esto sólo tiene la posibilidad de rechazar toda acción que emplea medios moralmente peligrosos - en la teoría! En el mundo real, por regla general, encontramos una y otra vez que el adherente de una ética de fines últimos de repente se convierte en un profeta milenarista. Aquellos, por ejemplo, quiénes acaban de predicar 'el amor contra la violencia' ahora piden el uso de fuerza para un último hecho violento, que llevaría entonces a una situación en la cual toda la violencia es aniquilada. De la misma manera, antes de cada ofensiva nuestros oficiales dijeron a los soldados: 'esta será la última;  traerá la victoria y por tanto la paz.' El defensor de una ética de fines absolutos no puede oponerse a la irracionalidad ética del mundo. Él es un  'racionalista' cósmico-ético. Aquellos de ustedes que conocen a Dostoievski recordarán la escena de 'El Gran Inquisidor' donde este problema es presentado de manera conmovedora. Si uno hace la mas mínima concesión al principio de que el fin justifica los medios, no es posible reunir una ética de fines últimos con una ética de la responsabilidad o decretar éticamente que fines debería justificar que medios.
My colleague, Mr. F. W. Forster, whom personally I highly esteem for his undoubted sincerity, but whom I reject unreservedly as a politician, believes it is possible to get around this difficulty by the simple thesis: 'from good comes only good; but from evil only evil follows.'  In that case this whole complex of questions would not exist. But it is rather astonishing that such a thesis could come to light two thousand five hundred years after the Upanishads. Not only the whole course of world history, but every frank examination of everyday experience points to the very opposite. The development of religions all over the world is determined by the fact that the opposite is true. The age-old problem of theodicy consists of the very question of how it is that a power which is said to be at once omnipotent and kind could have created such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, unpunished injustice, and hopeless stupidity. Either this power is not omnipotent or not kind, or, entirely different principles of compensation and reward govern our life - principles we may interpret metaphysically, or even principles that forever escape our comprehension.	Mi colega, el señor F. W. Forster, a quien personalmente estimo mucho por su indudable sinceridad, pero a quien rechazo sin reservas como político, cree que es posible evitar la dificultad mediante esta simple tesis: 'de lo bueno sólo viene lo bueno; pero del mal sólo el mal se sigue.' Si ese fuera el caso este complejo entero de preguntas no existiría. Pero es bastante asombroso que tal tesis pudiera salir a la luz dos mil quinientos años después de los Upanishads. No sólo el curso entero de la historia mundial, sino cada examen franco de la experiencia diaria señalan lo opuesto. El desarrollo de religiones en todo el mundo esta determinado por el hecho que lo opuesto es verdad. El problema histórico de la teodicea consiste en la pregunta de cómo es que un poder que se dice es omnipotente y bueno podría haber creado un mundo tan irracional de sufrimiento inmerecido, injusticia impune, y estupidez sin remedio. O ese poder no es omnipotente o no es amable, o, principios completamente diferentes de compensación y recompensa gobiernan nuestra vida - principios que podemos interpretar metafísicamente, o incluso principios que por siempre escaparán a nuestra comprensión.
This problem - the experience of the irrationality of the world - has been the driving force of all religious evolution. The Indian doctrine of karma, Persian dualism, the doctrine of original sin, predestination and the deus absconditus, all these have grown out of this experience. Also the early Christians knew full well the world is governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and  force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.	Este problema - la experiencia de la irracionalidad del mundo - ha sido la fuerza impulsora de toda la evolución religiosa. La doctrina india del karma, el dualismo Persa, la doctrina de pecado original, la predestinación y el deus absconditus, todos éstos han crecido de esta experiencia. También los primeros cristianos sabían muy bien que el mundo es gobernado por demonios y que él que se permite involucrar en la política, es decir para conseguir poder y usando ña fuerza como medio, establece un contrato con poderes diabólicos y que por esta acción no es verdad que lo bueno sólo puede venir del bien y el mal sólo del mal, sino que a menudo lo opuesto es verdad. Alguien que no puede ver esto es, en efecto, un niño político.
We are placed into various life-spheres, each of which is governed by different laws. Religious ethics have settled with this fact in different ways. Hellenic polytheism made sacrifices to Aphrodite and Hera ahke, to Dionysus and to Apollo, and knew these gods were frequently in conflict with one another. The Hindu order of life made each of the different occupations an object of a specific ethical code, a Dharma, and forever segregated one from the other as castes, thereby placing them into a fixed hierarchy of rank. For the man born into it, there was no escape from it, lest he be twice-born in another life. The occupations were thus placed at varying distances from the highest religious goods of salvation. In this way, the caste order allowed for the possibility of fashioning the Dharma of each single caste, from those of the ascetics and Brahmins to those of the rogues and harlots, in accordance with the immanent and autonomous laws of their respective occupations. War and politics were also included. You will find war integrated into the totality of life-spheres in the Bhagavad-Gita, in the conversation between Krishna and Arduna. 'Do what must be done,' i.e. do that work which, according to the Dharma of the warrior caste and its rules, is obligatory and which, according to the purpose of the war, is objectively necessary. Hinduism believes that such conduct does not damage religious salvation but, rather, promotes it. When he faced the hero's death, the Indian warrior was always sure of Indra's heaven, just as was the Teuton warrior of Valhalla. The Indian hero would have despised Nirvana just as much as the Teuton would have sneered at the Christian paradise with its angels' choirs. This specialization of ethics allowed for the Indian ethic's quite unbroken treatment of politics by following politics' own laws and even radically enhancing this royal art.
A really radical 'Machiavellianism,' in the popular sense of this word, is classically represented in Indian literature, in the Kautaliya Arthasastra (long before Christ, allegedly dating from Chandragupta's time). In contrast with this document Machiavelli's Principe is harmless. As is known in Catholic ethics - to which otherwise Professor Forster stands close -the consilia evangelica are a special ethic for those endowed with the charisma of a holy life. There stands the monk who must not shed blood or strive for gain, and beside him stand the pious knight and the burgher, who are allowed to do so, the one to shed blood, the other to pursue gain. The gradation of ethics and its organic integration into the doctrine of salvation is less consistent than in India. According to the presuppositions of Christian faith, this could and had to be the case. The wickedness of the world stemming from original sin allowed with relative ease the integration of violence into ethics as a disciplinary means against sin and against the heretics who endangered the soul. However, the demands of the Sermon on the Mount, an acosmic ethic of ultimate ends, implied a natural law of absolute imperatives based upon religion. These absolute imperatives retained their revolutionizing force and they came upon the scene with elemental vigor during almost all periods of social upheaval. They produced especially the radical pacifist sects, one of which in Pennsylvania experimented in establishing a polity that renounced violence towards the outside. This experiment took a tragic course, inasmuch as with the outbreak of the War of Independence the Quakers could not stand up arms-in-hand for their ideals, which were those of the war.
Normally, Protestantism, however, absolutely legitimated the state as a divine institution and hence violence as a means. Protestantism, especially, legitimated the authoritarian state. Luther relieved the individual of the ethical responsibility for war and transferred it to the authorities. To obey the authorities in matters other than those of faith could never constitute guilt. Calvinism in turn knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith; thus Calvinism knew the crusade, which was for Islam an element of life from the beginning. One sees that it is by no means a modern disbehef born from the hero worship of the Renaissance which poses the problem of political ethics. All religions have wrestled with it, with highly differing success, and after what has been said it could not be otherwise. It is the specific means of legitimate violence as such in the hand of human associations which determines the peculiarity of all ethical problems of politics.
Whosoever contracts with violent means for whatever ends - and every politician does - is exposed to its specific consequences. This holds espe cially for the crusader, religious and revolutionary alike. Let us confidently take the present as an example. He who wants to establish absolute justice on earth by force requires a following, a human 'machine.'  He must hold out the necessary internal and external premiums, heavenly or worldly reward, to this 'machine' or else the machine will not function. Under the conditions of the modern class struggle, the internal premiums consist oi. the satisfying of hatred and the craving for revenge; above all, resentment and the need for pseudo-ethical self-righteousness: the opponents must be slandered and accused of heresy. The external rewards are adventure, victory, booty, power, and spoils. The leader and his success are completely dependent upon the functioning of his machine and hence not on his own motives. Therefore he also depends upon whether or not the premiums can be permanently granted to the following, that is, to the Red Guard, the informers, the agitators, whom he needs. What he actually attains under the conditions of his work is therefore not in his hand, but is prescribed to him by the following's motives, which, if viewed ethically, are predominantly base. The following can be harnessed only so long as an honest belief in his person and his cause inspires at least part of the following, probably never on earth even the majority. This belief, even when subjectively sincere, is in a very great number of cases really no more than an ethical 'legitimation' of cravings for revenge, power, booty, and spoils. We shall not be deceived about this by verbiage; the materialist interpretation of history is no cab to be taken at will; it does not stop short of the promoters of revolutions. Emotional revolutionism is followed by the traditionalist routine of everyday life; the crusading leader and the faith itself fade away, or, what is even more effective, the faith becomes part of the conventional phraseology of political Philistines and banausic technicians. This development is especially rapid with struggles of faith because they are usually led or inspired by genuine leaders, that is, prophets of revolution. For here, as with every leader's machine, one of the conditions for success is the depersonalization and routinization, in short, the psychic proletarianization, in the interests of discipline. After coming to power the following of a crusader usually degenerates very easily into a quite common stratum of spoilsmen.
Whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He must know that he is responsible for what may become of himself under the impact of these paradoxes. I repeat, he lets himself in for the diabolic forces lurking in all violence. The great virtuosi of acosmic love of humanity and goodness, whether stemming from Nazareth or Assisi or from Indian royal castles, have not operated with the political means of violence. Their kingdom was 'not of this world' and yet they worked and still work in this world. The figures of Platon Karatajev and the saints of Dostoievski still remain their most adequate reconstructions. He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in an inner tension with the god of love, as well as with the Christian God  as expressed by the church. This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcilable conflict. Men knew this even in the times of church rule. Time and again the papal interdict was placed upon Florence and at the time it meant a far more robust power for men and their salvation of soul than (to speak with Fichte) the 'cool approbation' of the Kantian ethical judgment. The burghers, however, fought the church-state. And it is with reference to such situations that Machiavelli in a beautiful passage, if I am not mistaken, of the History of Florence, has one of his heroes praise those citizens who deemed the greatness of their native city higher than the salvation of their souls.
If one says 'the future of socialism' or 'international peace,' instead of native city or 'fatherland' (which at present may be a dubious value to some), then you face the problem as it stands now. Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking, and two diabolic forces which enter the play remain unknown to the actor. These are inexorable and produce consequences for his action and even for his inner self, to which he must helplessly submit, unless he perceives them. The sentence: 'The devil is old; grow old to understand him!' does not refer to age in terms of chronological years.
I have never permitted myself to lose out in a discussion through a reference to a date registered on a birth certificate; but the mere fact that someone is twenty years of age and that I am over fifty is no cause for me to think that this alone is an achievement before which I am overawed. Age is not decisive; what is decisive is the trained relentless in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly.
Surely, politics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone. In this the proponents of an ethic of ultimate ends are right.
One cannot prescribe to anyone whether he should follow an ethic of absolute ends or an ethic of responsibility, or when the one and when the other. One can say only this much: If in these times, which, in your opinion, are not times of ‘sterile’ excitation -excitation is not, after all, genuine passion- if now suddenly the Weltanschauungs politicians crop up en masse and pass the watchword, ‘The world is stupid and base, not I,’ ‘The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon the others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baseness I shall eradicate,’ then I declare frankly that I would first inquire into the degree of inner poise backing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am under the impression that in nine out of ten cases I deal with windbags who do not fully realize what they take upon themselves but who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations. From a human point of view this is not very interesting to me, nor does it move me profoundly. However, it is immensely moving when a mature man - no matter whether old or young in years - is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do no other.'  That is something genuinely human and moving. And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the possibility of finding himself at some time in that position. In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man - a man who can have the 'calling for politics.'
Now then, ladies and gentlemen, let us debate this matter once more ten years from now. Unfortunately, for a whole series of reasons, I fear that by then the period of reaction will have long since broken over us. It is very probable that little of what many of you, and (I candidly confess) I too, have wished and hoped for will be fulfilled;  little - perhaps not exactly nothing, but what to us at least seems little. This will not crush me, but surely it is an inner burden to realize it. Then, I wish I could see what has become of those of you who now feel yourselves to be genuinely 'principled' politicians and who share in the intoxication signified by tiiis revolution. It would be nice if matters turned out in such a way that Shakespeare's Sonnet 102 should hold true:
Our love was new, and then but in the spring,
When I was wont to greet it with my lays;
As Philomel in summer's front doth sing,
And stops her pipe in growth of riper days.
But such is not the case. Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but also the proletarian has lost his rights. When this night shall have slowly receded, who of those for whom spring apparently has bloomed so luxuriously will be alive? And what will have become of  all of you by then? Will you be bitter or banausic? Will you simply and dully accept world and occupation? Or will the third and by no means the least frequent possibility be your lot: mystic flight from reality for those who are gifted for it, or - as is both frequent and unpleasant - for those who belabor themselves to follow this fashion? In every one of such cases, I shall draw the conclusion that they have not measured up to their own doings. They have not measured up to the world as it really is in its everyday routine. Objectively and actually, they have not experienced the vocation for politics in its deepest meaning, which they thought they had. They would have done better in simply cultivating plain brotherliness in personal relations. And for the rest - they should have gone soberly about their daily work.
Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective. Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth - that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible. But to do that a man must be a leader, and not only a leader but a hero as well, in a very sober sense of the word. And even those who are neither leaders nor heroes must arm themselves with that steadfastness of heart which can brave even the crumbling of all hopes. This is necessary right now, or else men will not be able to attain even that which is possible today. Only he has the calling for politics who is sure that he shall not crumble when the world from his point of view is too stupid or too base for what he wants to offer. Only he who in the face of all this can say 'In spite of all!' has the calling for politics.

Una traducción completa (aunque con mas de un error) del texto esta bajo título El Político y El Científico